October 2022


First Voice
Urban Indigenous Coalition

Building Trust, Restoring Confidence

MMIWG Recommendations for Strengthening Police Oversight in Newfoundland and Labrador
Acknowledgements

This Final Report has been prepared by the First Voice Working Group on Police Oversight. First Voice gratefully acknowledges the financial and in-kind support provided by the Law Foundation of Newfoundland and Labrador, Mitacs, and the Schulich School of Law at Dalhousie University in the development of this Report.

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Executive Summary

This Final Report has been prepared by the First Voice Working Group on Police Oversight (“the Working Group”), a community-led project to review the system of police oversight in Newfoundland and Labrador and develop community-driven recommendations for improvement. The purpose of this Report is to lay the groundwork for moving towards more effective and transparent civilian oversight of policing in Newfoundland and Labrador, including the implementation of Calls for Justice 5.7 and 9.2(iii) of The Final Report of the National Inquiry into Missing and Murdered Indigenous Women and Girls. Both Calls urge all levels of government to establish robust and well-funded Indigenous civilian police oversight bodies.

This Report compares the current police oversight mechanisms in Newfoundland and Labrador to other jurisdictions in Canada, as well as other countries where appropriate. Based on an extensive jurisdictional scan, it is the opinion of the Working Group that Newfoundland and Labrador has among the weakest and least effective models for transparency and accountability of police. Unlike numerous other jurisdictions in Canada, Newfoundland and Labrador does not have a civilian-led police oversight board that can engage proactively with the public to identify community policing priorities while also ensuring meaningful accountability from police leadership.

Although Newfoundland and Labrador has a public complaints commission that receives and investigates complaints concerning police misconduct, that complaints commission lacks impartiality and transparency. Newfoundland and Labrador also has a serious incident response team that investigates more serious police wrongdoing, such as when police officers’ actions have led to the serious injury or death of an individual. Similar to the public complaints commission, however, the Serious Incident Response Team involves a self-investigative structure, which gives rise to serious concerns about impartiality. Furthermore, it is unclear whether either of these existing oversight bodies has the will – or even the legal authority – to investigate and address systemic problems in policing.

To address these problems with the existing system of police oversight in the province, this Report includes a detailed list of Recommendations for strengthening police oversight in Newfoundland and Labrador. The core changes that are being recommended include:

1. Establishing a new civilian-led Police Oversight Board (Group 1 Recommendations) that is politically neutral, independent of police, and reflects the province’s diverse communities (Group 2 Recommendations);
2. Strengthening and streamlining the public complaints process (Group 3 Recommendations); and
3. Improving confidence in the Serious Incident Response Team (Group 4 Recommendations).

In line with Call for Justice 9.2(iii), each of these three core proposals include diversity requirements to ensure that Indigenous people are appropriately represented on, and able to participate meaningfully in, all police oversight functions.

In the course of its deliberations, the Working Group also determined several other areas where further research – and likely policy change – is needed to ensure that police and police-like organizations in Newfoundland and Labrador are serving the public interest. Recommendations in these areas are found in Group 5.

The Final Recommendations that are laid out in this report were developed through extensive discussions among the diverse members of the Working Group, who led and directed all research
efforts. First Voice also carried out a thorough and robust public engagement process to gather feedback from targeted stakeholders as well as members of the public. All stakeholders had an opportunity to provide feedback on draft proposals before they were finalized as the Recommendations that are now included herein and directed toward the Government of Newfoundland and Labrador for implementation.
Message from the Working Group Co-Chairs

The Final Report you are reading is the product of many months of hard work by First Voice members, contributors, and support staff. It documents the many problems that exist with the way policing is done in Newfoundland and Labrador, including systemic racism and sexism, colonialisist approaches to law enforcement, and a lack of transparency and accountability from those who have been tasked with keeping us all safe. And yet this report does more than just criticize the existing system. Drawing on the Calls for Justice of the National Inquiry into Missing and Murdered Indigenous Women and Girls, this Final Report advances clear and actionable solutions to begin to address systemic problems in policing in our province.

These solutions were developed through a robust process of research, discussion, collaboration, and community engagement. There are a broad range of opinions and ideas in our community about how to fix systemic problems in policing in Newfoundland and Labrador. Some people feel that the best way to approach these problems is to abolish altogether a system that has much too long a history of serving colonialisist and racist ends. Others believe that defunding police forces in the province would prove just as effective a solution. Still others are of the view that the system is not fundamentally broken and that it can be salvaged through carefully considered reforms. And some feel that the existing system is already working well enough.

Our working group considered all of these positions. We believe that the contents of this report and the solutions it recommends represent a reasonable compromise struck between many diverse and sometimes competing views and interests. We also believe that our Final Recommendations articulate a growing consensus among Newfoundlanders and Labradorians on how best to begin to fix policing so that it serves all peoples and communities equally well.

As Co-Chairs, we wish to thank the members of the Working Group who so generously shared their time, professional expertise, and lived experiences. We also thank the many individuals and organizations that took the time to review our draft report and submit their feedback on it. You have all done your part. Now it is time for those in government to do theirs.

Catherine Fagan, Co-Chair
Working Group on Police Oversight
First Voice

Caitlin Urquhart, Co-Chair
Working Group on Police Oversight
First Voice
Introduction

This Final Report has been prepared by the First Voice Working Group on Police Oversight ("the Working Group"). A collaborative project bringing together First Voice Partners, Contributors, and supporters with community members, government agencies, and other stakeholders, the Working Group undertook to develop a provincial framework for implementing Calls for Justice 5.7 and 9.2(iii) of The Final Report of the National Inquiry into Missing and Murdered Indigenous Women and Girls ("MMIWG"). Those Calls for Justice can be found at Appendix A of this Report.

These two Calls for Justice urge federal, provincial, and territorial governments to establish robust and well-funded Indigenous civilian police oversight bodies within their own jurisdictions. They also call upon all actors within the justice system to work together to ensure adequate and appropriate Indigenous representation, including Indigenous women, Elders, youth, and 2SLGBTQIA+ people within all such oversight bodies.

While Calls for Justice 5.7 and 9.2(iii) are specific to Indigenous oversight and representation, this Report encompasses civilian-led police oversight more generally. This Final Report is not meant to be a standalone report; rather, it is intended to lay the foundation for building more effective and transparent civilian oversight of policing in Newfoundland and Labrador. As a first step, the Working Group has developed a detailed list of Recommendations for strengthening police oversight in Newfoundland and Labrador more broadly. These Recommendations can be found at Appendix C of this Report. Further legal and policy research, undertaken by or in close collaboration with the Department of Justice and Public Safety, will be required to determine more precisely how these Recommendations are to be implemented.

This Final Report has one main purpose: to provide a framework for the Government of Newfoundland and Labrador to implement Calls for Justice 5.7 and 9.2(iii). It does so by summarizing the Working Group’s deliberations, which were carried out over a period of 15 months, and the conclusions that were reached as a result. That process also included extensive community engagement to elicit feedback from stakeholders and members of the public on the proposed changes. This Final Report outlines a set of Recommendations that the Working Group believes are urgently needed to strengthen civilian-led oversight of police services in Newfoundland and Labrador in a way that aligns with the Calls for Justice. Only then can real trust be built between police and the communities they are meant to serve, and confidence that police are serving the public interest be restored.

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1 More information on the Working Group can be found throughout this report as well as online at: https://firstvoicenl.ca/article/community-led-working-group-on-police-oversight-announced/.
How This Final Report Was Produced

Creating the First Voice Working Group on Police Oversight

In early 2021 the First Voice Urban Indigenous Coalition launched a working group to review the existing system of police oversight in Newfoundland and Labrador and develop recommendations for strengthening that system in line with the MMIWG Calls for Justice. Under the leadership of First Light St. John’s Friendship Centre and the St. John’s Status of Women Council, additional stakeholders were identified and invited to join the working group. These stakeholders included community groups, service organizations, government agencies, community members, academics, legal experts, and other allies.

By April 2021 the working group had drafted formal Terms of Reference setting out its purpose, mandate, membership, scope of work, and decision-making processes. (These Terms of Reference can be found at Appendix B.) When the formation of the First Voice Working Group on Police Oversight was announced in June 2021, two Co-Chairs – both lawyers – had been selected and a total of six organizations had signed on as Permanent Members. Several individuals also joined as Associate Members to contribute their professional expertise and share their lived experiences.

Over the course of the next 13 months, the Working Group convened regularly to identify challenges with respect to policing in the province, direct legal and policy research, and share ideas for strengthening the system of police oversight in a way that would align with the two Calls for Justice. The results of these discussions were summarized in a draft report that was released on July 18, 2022. That draft report put forward 26 specific Proposals for Change that the Working Group believed were worth wider consideration and broader public discussion.

Public Engagement Process

With the release of the draft report and the Proposals for Change, a six-week period of public engagement began. The public engagement process included both quantitative and qualitative components.

To measure the degree of public support for the three core changes that the Working Group had proposed, First Voice commissioned a public opinion poll. Conducted by MQO Research between July 25 and 31, 2022, the poll revealed that 88% of Newfoundlanders and Labradorians supported the creation of a police oversight board along the lines put forward in the Group 1 and 2 Proposals, with a majority of respondents (52%) expressing “strong support” for the idea. Support was consistently high across all key demographics, including age, gender and sexual identities, racial identities, voting intentions, and geographic regions.

88% of Newfoundlanders and Labradorians supported the creation of a police oversight board along the lines put forward in the Group 1 and 2 Proposals, with a majority of respondents

52% expressed “strong support” for the idea.
Further, only half of all respondents indicated a high level of confidence that police officers in Newfoundland and Labrador are “held to the same standards of justice as everyone else.” A minority of respondents (40%) indicated they trust the kind of self-investigative structure that is used by the Royal Newfoundland Constabulary Public Complaints Commission (“RNC PCC”) and the Serious Incident Response Team of Newfoundland and Labrador (“SIRT-NL”).

At the same time, First Voice worked to supplement this quantitative data by collecting direct feedback from stakeholders to help inform the Working Group’s Final Recommendations. In this way, more than 30 stakeholders were identified representing a range of views and interests, including Indigenous organizations and governments, agencies and departments of the provincial government, service providers, community and activist groups, academics, and members of the legal community both within and beyond St. John’s. First Voice shared the Working Group’s draft report with them and invited their feedback on the Proposals for Change. A select list of stakeholders, indicating some of those who provided feedback, can be found at Appendix E.

50% indicated a high level of confidence that police officers in Newfoundland and Labrador are “held to the same standards of justice as everyone else.”

40% indicated they trust the kind of self-investigative structure that is used by the Royal Newfoundland Constabulary Public Complaints Commission (“RNC PCC”) and the Serious Incident Response Team of Newfoundland and Labrador (“SIRT-NL”).

First voice provided the necessary support to ensure that all interested stakeholders, whether organizations or individuals, had an opportunity to provide feedback on the draft report. As a result of the qualitative component of the engagement process, the following themes emerged:

- **Training requirements for police officers need to be strengthened.** Many stakeholders expressed the view that the requirements to become a police officer, and training that is available to them after they join the RNC or the RCMP, is inadequate. Several expressed strong support for implementing more stringent requirements such as to those that are in place in Sweden.

- **Police forces operating in the province are not responsive enough to the communities they serve.** Several stakeholders – both organizations and individuals – expressed frustrations that neither the RNC nor the RCMP appear to take seriously the priorities of the communities in which they operate. Most felt that a civilian-led police oversight board would improve these conditions.

- **Policing standards and policies are created neither transparently nor in a way that best serves communities.** Multiple stakeholders expressed concerns that policies with respect to the way that policing is conducted in communities are either created unilaterally by police forces, without public consultation, or else adopted out of political expediency. All agreed that transferring these powers to a police oversight board that is politically neutral and completely independent of police would improve transparency and accountability.

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4 Full poll results, including a summary report and data tables, can be found online at https://firstvoicenl.ca/article/overwhelming-majority-support-creation-of-police-oversight-board-poll/.
A careful balance needs to be struck when determining eligibility requirements for serving on a police oversight board. While stakeholders agreed that measures to ensure the political neutrality of the Board were essential, some expressed concern that excluding former publicly elected officials and those who are current members of any political party would go too far. A consistent point that was raised in this respect was the observation that anyone falling within either of these two groups was likely to be highly engaged in their community and would, for that reason, be a good candidate to consider for the Board. All stakeholders who commented on eligibility requirements agreed that current publicly elected officials, as well as anyone serving as an official or as a member of staff with any political party, should be excluded from consideration.

The public complaints process is overly complicated, difficult to understand, and rarely produces helpful outcomes. A number of individuals shared their personal experiences trying to navigate the process for reporting police (noncriminal) misconduct. They expressed frustration at the lack of supports throughout the process and the dissatisfaction they felt when it had concluded. At least one individual noted that their complaint had yet to be resolved years after initiating it. Another individual shared that they had been harassed by the officer against whom they had filed a complaint, even while the complaints process was still unfolding.

All but one organizational stakeholder expressed strong support for the three core Proposals for Change.

Finalizing the Proposals for Change as Recommendations

The Working Group then reconvened on September 7, 2022, to consider the qualitative feedback that had been gathered during the public engagement process. At that meeting, Working Group members reached consensus on finalizing the Proposals for Change as formal Recommendations.

With respect to the Recommendations to create a new Police Oversight Board, the following changes were adopted:

- The Board’s mandate has been expanded to encompass any Indigenous police forces that may be created in the future (Recommendation 1.1).
- The Board is also explicitly empowered to establish appropriate branches or special offices that it may deem necessary to fulfilling its purpose (Recommendation 1.2).
- Lines of responsibility and accountability have been adjusted, with the Chair of the Board being appointed by and reporting directly to the House of Assembly as a statutory officer (Recommendation 2.1).

Recommendation 1.1

The Police Oversight Board must be empowered by statute to provide independent, civilian-led, proactive oversight of, and high-level policy direction to, all police forces that operate in the province. This includes:

a. The Royal Newfoundland Constabulary ("the RNC");

b. Members of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police ("the RCMP") operating in Newfoundland and Labrador; and

c. Any Indigenous police forces that may be created in the future.

Recommendation 1.2

The Police Oversight Board must have all delegated authority commensurate with a regulatory tribunal, including the authority and the budgetary resources to:

a. Retain, train, and terminate any staff that are necessary to fulfilling its statutory mandate; and

b. Establish any appropriate branches or special offices to provide oversight in specific areas of policing or to address specific issues and priorities.

Recommendation 2.1

The Police Oversight Board must be empowered by statute as a regulatory commission, with its Chair appointed by and reporting directly to the House of Assembly through the Speaker as a statutory officer, in order to guarantee its political neutrality and independence from both the police and the government of the day.
Eligibility for serving on the board has been expanded by specifying conditions under which former publicly elected officials may be appointed and limiting partisan exclusions to those who are currently serving as officials or staff with a political party (Recommendation 2.3).

With respect to the Recommendations for strengthening and streamlining the public complaints process, the following change was adopted:

Leadership requirements for the RNC PCC have been expanded to include both sitting and former judges (Recommendation 3.2).

No specific feedback was received from stakeholders with respect to the Proposals for Change to improve confidence in SIRT-NL. These Final Recommendations remain unchanged compared to the Proposals that were put forward in the draft report.

**Recommendation 2.3**

In order to further safeguard the Police Oversight Board’s neutrality, sitting commissioners may not be any of the following:

- Current or former police officers;
- Current publicly elected officials;
- Former publicly elected officials who have held office in the previous two years; or
- Current officials or staff of any political party.

**Recommendation 3.2**

By no later than 2025, the RNC PCC must transition to leadership under a sitting or former judge, rather than a practising lawyer. This requirement must be formalized in statute.
Background

In the summer of 2020, communities of colour led protests across North America – including here in Newfoundland and Labrador – against systemic racism in policing. The problem is well established and well documented. Senator Murray Sinclair, who served as the Chair of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, defined systemic racism as: “when the system itself is based upon and founded upon racist beliefs and philosophies and thinking and has put in place policies and practices that literally force even the non-racists to act in a racist way.” Concerns about systemic racism within policing organizations in Canada, along with repeated calls to address it, have been raised in communities across the country and even within some police services themselves.

In Canada, the problem of systemic racism in policing is nearly as old as policing itself. In 1873, the North-West Mounted Police (“NWMP”) was created, which eventually became the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (“RCMP”). The NWMP was created to advance the agenda of the newly established colonial state:

For over a century, the central goals of Canada’s Aboriginal policy were to eliminate Aboriginal governments; ignore Aboriginal rights; terminate the Treaties; and, through a process of assimilation, cause Aboriginal peoples to cease to exist as distinct legal, social, cultural, religious, and racial entities in Canada. The establishment and operation of residential schools were a central element of this policy, which can best be described as “cultural genocide.”

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First the NWMP, and then the RCMP, helped assimilate and forcibly relocate Indigenous people onto reserves and settlements. From 1885 until the 1940s, for example, it enforced the Pass system, which restricted First Nations people to reserves without allowing them to leave unless they had permission from an Indian agent. Any disobedience would result in the RCMP assaulting, bullying, and jailing First Nations people. The Report of the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples ("RCAP") links reserves and the Pass system to early markers of prisons. The RCMP also played a role in residential schools, including actively searching for Indigenous children and delivering them to residential schools, forcibly removing Indigenous children from their families, and often acting as truant officers.

In Newfoundland and Labrador, the history of systemic racism against Indigenous Peoples vis-à-vis law enforcement is somewhat different compared to the rest of Canada. When the Dominion of Newfoundland joined Canada as the tenth province in 1949, Indigenous Peoples were omitted from the Terms of Union. Joey Smallwood, who brought the province into Confederation with Canada, infamously claimed that there were "no Indians on the island of Newfoundland." In many ways, the province has yet to fully grapple with what has been called a "lasting breach" between the provincial government and the Indigenous Peoples who call Newfoundland and Labrador home.

The denial of the very existence of Indigenous Peoples in Newfoundland and Labrador not only deprived them of programs and services that were available to Indigenous Peoples elsewhere in the country. It also meant, more fundamentally, the denial of their traditions and their inherent rights as stewards of the land. As a result, fisheries and wildlife officers began to enforce the criminalization of Indigenous ways of life. As the Assembly of First Nations ("AFN") puts it, "those who were once considered providers became poachers." And while residential and boarding schools devastated entire generations of Indigenous Peoples in Newfoundland and Labrador, as they did elsewhere in Canada, for some communities, colonialist conservation policies led to their first contact with law enforcement and resulted in the devastation of social orders and traditions.

When questioned in 2020 the head of the RCMP, Commissioner Brenda Lucki, denied the allegation that there was systemic racism within the RCMP. (The Commissioner later retracted her statement and accepted that...
systemic racism does exist within the RCMP.) These issues are not new in Newfoundland and Labrador, which is policed by the RCMP and the Royal Newfoundland Constabulary ("RNC").

The absence of any kind of civilian-led police oversight board in Newfoundland and Labrador makes it difficult if not impossible to address well known problems such as systemic racism in a responsible and proactive way. It also hampers the Province’s ability to address other related issues, such as a lack of police accountability and widespread community mistrust of both the RNC and the RCMP. Together, this cluster of issues points to the urgent need to strengthen civilian-led police oversight mechanisms in the province.

The media has often reported on stories describing actions of RNC and RCMP officers that contribute to community mistrust. Recently, for example, two RCMP officers entered a home in a community on the West Coast of Newfoundland while the family who lived there was asleep. Officers proceeded to question an 11-year-old girl in the child’s bedroom while shining a flashlight in her face, without parental notice or consent. Troubling allegations concerning operations within the RNC have also been reported on, including dysfunctional management practices such as favouritism in promotions. Examples such as these are not isolated incidents; rather, they are a direct embodiment of the systemic policing issues in the province.

There has been, and continues to be, systemic issues within the RCMP, including decades of ongoing sexual harassment and racism. Recently, concerns of similar systemic issues within the RNC have also come to light. In a report drafted in August 2022, the AFN in Newfoundland and Nova Scotia documented experiences of racism that First Nations people have had when interacting with police forces on the island of Newfoundland. In a series of engagement sessions held in communities across the island, including in Corner Brook and St. John’s – both areas that are policed by the RNC – the AFN found that “many community members are intimidated by the presence of officers, which results in a lack of cooperation, trust, and respect for those who are meant to serve them.”

The report describes racist interactions between First Nations people and police officers, including the confiscation of sacred items such as eagle feathers and medicine bundles, physical intimidation, and being openly mocked by officers. The report also reveals that First Nations communities are often considered low priority, with some calls to police being ignored entirely. Recognizing that some First Nations communities have not had productive relationships with either police force, the AFN recommends streamlining grievances and complaints processes as well as establishing independent oversight bodies in Newfoundland in order to build trust and

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23 See “First Nations Policing”.
24 Ibid., p. 17.
25 Ibid., p. 19.
confidence in the province’s police services among First Nations people. 26

*“Many community members are intimidated by the presence of officers, which results in a lack of cooperation, trust, and respect for those who are meant to serve them.” — AFN*

In addition to systemic racism within the RNC, there is also evidence of systemic sexism, misogyny, and even sexual assault against civilians. Beginning in the summer of 2021, more than a dozen women have come forward with allegations that they were sexually assaulted by on-duty RNC officers. 27,28 The women have described a disturbingly consistent pattern of behaviour among their attackers that involves prowling the downtown streets of St. John’s late at night in RNC cruisers, offering women a ride home, and then assaulting them. In response to the allegations, on October 19, 2021, the Minister of Justice and Public Safety ordered a workplace review of the RNC. 29

Released on July 15, 2022, the Royal Newfoundland Constabulary Workplace Review (“the RNC Workplace Review”) found significant problems across a wide range of areas, including systemic sexism and misogyny, gaps in essential training, poor allocation of resources, confusing and inaccessible human resources and operational policies, seemingly arbitrary use of discipline, fears of reprisal for reporting the misconduct of fellow officers, and a management structure that is ill-suited to a modern police force. 30 Harriet Lewis, the lawyer who conducted the review, concluded that, taken together, these problems have contributed to a toxic workplace and a lack of transparency and accountability within the RNC, suggesting that “transformative change” would be needed to address them. 31

Given the troubling history of policing in the province, it is clear that existing policing policies, training standards, and oversight mechanisms are insufficient for addressing community concerns of police conduct and accountability. Without an effective civilian-led police oversight body with the power to implement the necessary policies, regulations, and training standards, and to provide oversight to ensure compliance with them, examples of police misconduct such as those cited above are likely to continue. That does not need to be the case – especially considering that residents of Newfoundland and Labrador are able to access other public services through entities which are accountable to oversight bodies. Police services should be no different.

Without an effective civilian-led police oversight body with the power to implement the necessary policies, regulations, and training standards, and to provide oversight to ensure compliance with them, examples of police misconduct such as those cited above are likely to continue.

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26 Ibid., p. 34.  
28 A female officer with the RNC has also alleged she was raped by an off-duty colleague. See Sarah Smellie, Lawsuit alleges Royal Newfoundland Constabulary officer raped off-duty colleague, May 20, 2022, online: https://atlantic.ctvnews.ca/lawsuit-alleges-royal-newfoundland-constabulary-officer-raped-off-duty-colleague-1.5912859.  
29 See CTV news article dated October 19, 2021, online: https://atlantic.ctvnews.ca/n-l-government-orders-review-of-royal-newfoundland-constabulary-workplace-review-1.5629526; it does not appear that public concerns surrounding management practices of the RNC were included within the scope of the Workplace Review that was initiated by the Minister of Justice.  
31 RNC Workplace Review, p. 3.
Oversight bodies are common across various professions. Two examples of oversight bodies protecting the public in the province are that of the Newfoundland and Labrador Dental Board (“NLDB”) and the Law Society of Newfoundland and Labrador (“LSNL”). The NLDB investigates misconduct on behalf of dentists operating in Newfoundland and Labrador, and has the power to discipline dentists for misconduct. One recent case was that of Dr. Louis Bourget who allowed a prison guard to extract several teeth of a sedated prisoner who was receiving dental care from Dr. Bourget. Bourget was fined a total of $25,500 and received a six-month suspension of his license to practice dentistry, with further disciplinary action pending the outcome of the criminal charges arising from the incident.32

The LSNL is a similar type of regulatory body that is authorized by Newfoundland and Labrador’s Law Society Act to regulate the practice of law and the legal profession in the public interest. The LSNL protects the public by regulating the legal profession in such ways as: acting as a gatekeeper to the legal profession by requiring that all lawyers are of good character and fit to practice law; maintaining a comprehensive directory which outlines contact information for all practicing lawyers; maintaining a law library available to the public; promoting lawyer competence by requiring that all practicing lawyers continue their legal education while practicing; conducting regular trust audits to ensure lawyers are compliant with the Law Society Rules; conducting reviews of lawyers’ practices; and receiving complaints about lawyers and ensuring that all complaints follow the appropriate disciplinary process.33

These are but two examples of professions in Newfoundland and Labrador where oversight can and does protect the public. It is time for policing in the province to face similar oversight and accountability.

33 Law Society Newfoundland & Labrador. For the Public. Online: https://lsnl.ca/public/
In Canada, there are four levels of police services: federal, provincial, Indigenous, and municipal. At the federal level is the RCMP, which is responsible for enforcing federal laws. The RCMP also provides policing services, under contract, in all territories and provinces except Ontario and Quebec. Both of these provinces have their own provincial police forces, namely the Ontario Provincial Police (“OPP”) and the Sûreté du Québec (“SQ”), which are responsible for policing all areas of their respective provinces except for towns and cities that have municipal police forces.

While provinces are responsible for public policing, they often delegate responsibility to municipalities through provincial legislation – often called Police Acts. As a result, most cities and many large towns across Canada have their own municipal or city police forces.

### Policing in Newfoundland and Labrador

Compared to the rest of the country, the policing context in Newfoundland and Labrador is somewhat different. With no municipal police, there are only two active police forces in Newfoundland and Labrador: the RNC and the RCMP. With approximately 400 members, the RNC provides police services in the St. John’s metro region, Corner Brook, and Western Labrador. The RNC is established under, and governed by, the Royal Newfoundland Constabulary Act. A single Chief of Police serves as the commanding officer for the RNC in all three regions in which the RNC provides police services.

Police services in all other parts of Newfoundland and Labrador are provided by the RCMP, which operates a force of approximately 550 members in the province. Although the Royal Canadian Mounted Police Act is the governing legislation for the RCMP, pursuant to the Agreement for Policing in the Province Act, members of the RCMP stationed in the province are granted the same powers as members of the RNC, and the Commanding Officer of the RCMP is granted the same powers as the Chief of Police of the RNC. The RCMP is headed by a single Commissioner, a position currently held by Brenda Lucki, who works under the direction of the federal Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness.

In addition to the Commissioner, who oversees RCMP operations in the country, there are also Assistant Commissioners.
that serve as the commanding officer for a particular region.  

44 Assistant Commissioner Jennifer Ebert is the commanding officer appointed for Newfoundland and Labrador, assuming that role in April 2022.  

45 The Governor in Council (the Governor General acting on the advice of Cabinet) selects and appoints the Commissioner (i.e. Brenda Lucki), Deputy Commissioners, divisional and regional commanding officers of the RCMP (i.e. Assistant Commissioner Jennifer Ebert), as well as members of the Civilian Review and Complaints Commission (“CRCC”).  

The federal Cabinet also appoints lieutenant governors for each province, as representatives of the monarch for their respective provinces. The Honourable Judy Foote is currently the Lieutenant Governor of Newfoundland and Labrador.  

51 It is the Lieutenant Governor in Council (the Lieutenant Governor acting on the advice of Cabinet) who is empowered to appoint the commanding officer of the RNC, and has plenary power in relation to the RNC.  

53 The RNC Chief of Police is responsible for the general control and administration of the RNC, but the Chief of Police is accountable to, and takes general direction from, the provincial Minister of Justice and Public Safety.  

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44 RCMP Act, s. 6(1).  
46 Governor in Council appointments are made by the Governor General, on the advice of the King’s Privy Council of Canada (i.e., the Cabinet). See “Governor in Council appointments”, online: https://www.canada.ca/en/privy-council/programs/appointments/governor-council-appointments/general-information/appointments.html; the Governor General is the federal representative of the monarch and is the Commander-in-Chief of Canada, see: https://www.gg.ca/en/governor-general/role/responsibilities.  
47 RCMP Act section 5(1).  
48 RCMP Act section 9(3).  
49 RCMP Act section 6(1).  
50 RCMP Act section 45.29(1).  
51 The Governor General acting on the advice of Cabinet.  
53 RNC Act, s. 4(1).  
54 Ibid.  
55 RNC Act, s. 6(2).
Civilian Oversight

Defining Civilian Oversight

Oversight is defined as “systems or actions to control an activity and make sure that it is done correctly and legally.”\(^{56}\)

In the context of policing, the term “civilian oversight body” generally refers to a person, board, agency, commission, or other organisation responsible for setting, monitoring, and enforcing standards that are in line with democratic expectations of how police officers ought to conduct themselves in the course of executing their duties. Some oversight bodies are also responsible for processing complaints concerning police conduct in a province or territory.\(^{57}\) The overall goal of systems of civilian oversight of police is to build and maintain public confidence in the administration of justice.\(^{58}\) The main benefit of civilian oversight of police services is that it helps to ensure public confidence in – and cooperation with – the police.\(^{59}\)

Put more simply, civilian oversight of police involves the setting and enforcement of standards that are in line with the democratic values of society, and expectations of how police officers are to conduct themselves.

Civilian Oversight Bodies

Given the broad policing powers afforded to officers, including powers of search and seizure, detention and use of force, it is critical that they be accountable to the communities they serve. To achieve this, each province and territory may implement their own civilian oversight bodies to establish and set policing standards, monitor and review police effectiveness, and to conduct inquiries and complaint hearings. There are variations in the types of civilian oversight bodies in place across the country, as well as differences in their structure and operations, depending on the jurisdiction. Generally, oversight bodies in Canada fall into three categories:

- Provincial or municipal police boards;
- Public complaints commissions; and
- Independent investigatory bodies and/or units for serious incidents.

Each of these types of civilian-led police oversight bodies are considered in more detail in the sections that follow.

Based on an extensive jurisdictional scan, it is the opinion of the Working Group that Newfoundland and Labrador has among the weakest and least effective systems to ensure transparency and accountability of police. The findings that have led the Working Group to this conclusion are detailed in the next three sections. Those sections also outline the Working Group’s reasoning and vision for the three core Recommendations: establishing a new civilian-led police oversight board; strengthening the public complaints process; and improving the Serious Incident Response Team.

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\(^{56}\) Cambridge Dictionary, online: [https://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/oversight](https://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/oversight).

\(^{57}\) Police Act, SNB 1977, c P-9.2 at s 1.


Recommendations
We all beat as one
#JUSTICE
KORCHINSKI-PAQUET

FIGHT RACISM
IN NL
Group 1 & 2 Recommendations

“Civilian oversight is always a good thing. It’s important to get diverse perspectives that are removed from the culture [of policing] to be able to inform what is going on. And I think taking a lens that incorporates different cultural perspectives is really important to move forward and make sure we have a police service that understands equity, inclusion, and diversity.”

—Dr. Rose Ricciardelli, Professor of Criminology, Memorial University

Establish a New Civilian-Led Police Oversight Board in Newfoundland and Labrador

While Newfoundland and Labrador has a public complaints commission and Serious Incident Response Team, the province has no comprehensive system of civilian oversight of police, such as a police services board or police commission. In light of this major gap in police oversight in Newfoundland and Labrador, this section explores various provincial and municipal police boards that exist across Canada, in order to identify both best practices as well as issues to avoid.

Newfoundland and Labrador does not have municipal police forces, and this Report does not recommend that any be created. Nevertheless, the oversight mechanisms that are in place across the country, despite existing largely at the municipal level, are still instructive when it comes to identifying the benefits and challenges of improving police accountability within the provincial policing model that currently exists in Newfoundland and Labrador, which will likely continue into the foreseeable future.

Provincial and Municipal Police Boards: Options to Consider for Newfoundland and Labrador

Several provinces such as Ontario, Manitoba and Saskatchewan have provincial police oversight bodies. The Ontario Civilian Police Commission (“OCPC”) is a particularly interesting example of such an oversight body. The OCPC, like other police oversight boards, has the authority to conduct hearings into requests for the reduction, abolition, creation or amalgamation of police services; provides general enforcement relating to the adequacy and effectiveness of policing services; and conducts investigations and inquiries into the conduct of chiefs of police, police officers and members of police services boards. 61

60 See: CBC Radio’s St. John’s Morning Show for July 21, 2022, online: https://www.cbc.ca/listen/live-radio/1-56/clip/15926330 (at 7:05).
61 The OCPC powers and duties come from the Police Services Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. P. 15.
Generally, the legislated mandate of municipal police boards is to provide civilian oversight and administrative direction regarding the enforcement of law, the maintenance of the public peace, and the prevention of crime in a particular city. Board members are selected in a variety of ways, depending on the jurisdiction. For example, in Ontario, interested applicants may apply to become a provincially appointed member through listed vacancies on the Public Appointments Secretariat website. Qualifications include being a resident of the municipal area served by the board, passing a comprehensive background check, and being involved in the local community. Conversely, in Halifax, the City Council (and potentially the Solicitor General for the Province of Nova Scotia) appoints members to the Board of Police Commissioners for the Halifax Regional Municipality. In other jurisdictions, elected members of municipal councils may serve as ex officio members of their local police board. In British Columbia, for example, mayors are automatically appointed as Chair of their municipality’s police board, if one exists.

Manitoba offers an instructive comparative model, particularly in light of MMIWG Call for Justice 9.2(iii). In addition to having 11 municipal police boards, that province has also established the Manitoba Police Commission, which consists of five to nine members appointed by the provincial Cabinet. Further, The Police Services Act in Manitoba (“Manitoba PSA”) states that the provincial Cabinet must take into account the cultural and gender diversity of the province when appointing members to the Commission. The Manitoba Police Commission is responsible for various duties, including among others:

- Developing a policy and procedures manual for police boards and a code of ethical conduct for members of police boards;
- Arranging for training to be provided to members of police boards and civilian monitors; and
- Performing any other duties assigned by the Minister.

Section 26 of the Manitoba PSA states that every municipality that operates a police service must establish and maintain a police board. Police boards work closely with the police chief in the municipality to establish annual priorities and objectives for the police service that reflect the community’s needs and values. Specifically, a police board must ensure that:

63 Ontario Ministry of the Solicitor General, “Police services boards”, online: https://www.mcscs.jus.gov.on.ca/english/police_serv/PolicingServicesBoards/PSB.html.
64 Ibid.
65 [HRM] Respecting the Board of Police Commissioners for the Halifax Regional Municipality, By-law No. P-100.
66 (BC) Police Act, RSBC 1996, c 367 at s 23((1)(a).
67 That Call for Justice calls upon actors in the justice system to "ensure appropriate Indigenous representation, including Indigenous women, girls, and 2SLGBTQIA people.”
69 It is the Lieutenant Governor in Council, which is the Lieutenant Governor acting on the advice of Cabinet, that makes the appointments.
70 The Police Services Act, S.M. 2009, c. 32, s. 9(3) (“Manitoba PSA”).
71 Ibid, at s 9(2).
72 Ibid, s 7.
73 Ibid, s 26.
• The police chief establishes programs and strategies to implement the priorities set by the board for the police service;
• Community needs and values are reflected in the policing priorities, objectives, programs, and strategies; and
• Police services are delivered in a manner consistent with community needs, values, and expectations.75

Finally, the municipal police boards in Manitoba must operate in accordance with the Police Commission’s policy and procedures manual.76 Being able to establish policies and standards to ensure effective and accountable policing is critical. This includes ensuring appropriate requirements are in place for a person to become a police officer as well as the standards officers must adhere to after they complete their initial training and are posted to a detachment.

Policies and Standards

To become an RCMP officer, individuals must have a high school diploma (or equivalent such as a GED) and must attend a 26-week training course at the RCMP Depot in Regina, Saskatchewan.77 To become an officer with the RNC, applicants are required to have completed at least one academic year of post-secondary education or one year of military service with the Canadian Armed Forces. The RNC then requires that officers attend a six-month program called the RNC Cadet Training Program at the RNC Provincial Headquarters in St. John’s.78

In the case of the RNC in particular, it is clear that these training requirements are inadequate. In the RNC Workplace Review, nearly half of those surveyed (45%) felt they did not have adequate training to perform their duties. Harriet Lewis concluded that this indicates “a continuing problem with concerning consequences” because it impacts “the RNC’s risk profile.”79 As a result, at least some RNC officers have arranged their own training, on their own time and at their own expense, in order to feel confident that they are able to perform their duties safely and effectively. The RNC Workplace Review also found that “there is no organized management training for those who are promoted… to supervisory positions,” which no doubt contributes to the organizational dysfunction of the force.80

Notwithstanding these gaps in training, the requirements to become an officer with the RNC or the RCMP still fall far short when compared to some other countries. To become an officer with the Swedish Police Authority, for example, requires 2.5 years of training at one of five Swedish Universities. Once accepted, police training focuses on conflict resolution and crisis management, with special attention paid to studying human behaviour and interpersonal communications. Usually this course of training amounts to 300 hours of experience in social science, human relations, and psychology.

75 Manitoba PSA, at s 28(2).
76 Ibid, s 35(1).
80 RNC Workplace Review, p. 25.
The final step in training consists of a 24-week-long Officer Trainee Program.\textsuperscript{81} Going well beyond these already demanding requirements, nearly 45% of police chiefs in Sweden had a law degree as of 2013.\textsuperscript{82} It is surely no accident that the Swedish Police Authority has some of the highest levels of trust among citizens when compared to other police services around the world.\textsuperscript{83}

Currently, in Newfoundland and Labrador, additional policies and standards governing the conduct of RNC police officers\textsuperscript{84} may be established under the RNC Act. Under the Act, the Minister of Justice and Public Safety has authority to make further regulations that prescribe:

- Standards for police services;
- The RNC Public Complaints Commission’s (‘RNC PCC’) procedures and rules of proceedings regarding complaints as well as the conduct of an investigation;
- Use of force by police officers;
- The required standards of education or training courses for police officers; and
- A code of conduct or other rules in which offences constituting misconduct are described.\textsuperscript{85}

The RNC Act empowers the provincial Cabinet\textsuperscript{86} to appoint the Chief of the RNC. Currently, the approximately 400 members of the RNC answer to the RNC Chief of Police, who is directly accountable to the Minister of Justice for the Province, as provided in the Act:

- Monitoring the constabulary to ensure that adequate and effective police service is provided in the province;
- Monitoring the constabulary to ensure that police officers and other constabulary employees comply with required standards of service and discipline;
- Administering discipline in accordance with the Act;
- Developing and promoting programs to enhance professional police practices, standards, and training;
- Conducting a system of inspection and review of the constabulary; and
- Developing and promoting programs for community-oriented police services.\textsuperscript{88}

\textbf{Chief of Police and commissioned officers}

4(1) The Lieutenant Governor in Council shall appoint a commanding officer of the constabulary to be known as the Chief of Police, who, subject to the minister’s direction, has the general control and administration of the constabulary and its members.

4(2) The chief and commissioned officers shall hold office during the pleasure of the Lieutenant Governor in Council.\textsuperscript{87}

Given the political convention that the Minister of Justice – rightly – cannot give specific direction to the Chief of Police when it comes to the conduct of criminal investigations or other narrow operational matters, the existing chain of command has left the RNC’s leadership with little in the way of accountability mechanisms.

Under the same Act, the Chief of Police is responsible for:

- Monitoring the constabulary to ensure that adequate and effective police service is provided in the province;
- Monitoring the constabulary to ensure that police officers and other constabulary employees comply with required standards of service and discipline;
- Administering discipline in accordance with the Act;
- Developing and promoting programs to enhance professional police practices, standards, and training;
- Conducting a system of inspection and review of the constabulary; and
- Developing and promoting programs for community-oriented police services.\textsuperscript{88}

\textsuperscript{81} Polisprogrammet. Södertorn University. Online: https://www.sh.se/english/sodertorn-university/meet-sodertorn-university/this-is-sodertorn-university/organisation/police-studies.

\textsuperscript{82} Wahlberg S. Poliser tränger undan juristerna på de högre tjänsterna - endast 44 procent har en jur kand. 2013-02-12, Dagens Juridik. Online: https://www.dagensjuridik.se/nyheter/poliser-tranger-undan-juristerna-pa-de-hogre-tjansterna-endast-44-procent-har-en-jur-kand/.


\textsuperscript{84} Section 2(l) of the RNC Act defines police in a way that excludes the RCMP.

\textsuperscript{85} Ibid, at s 57.

\textsuperscript{86} It is the Lieutenant Governor acting on the advice of Cabinet that makes the appointments.

\textsuperscript{87} RNC Act, s 4(1).

\textsuperscript{88} RNC Act, at s 6.
Every provincial Police Act has its own provisions relating to police policies and standards as well as who sets them. In Nova Scotia, for example, the Minister of Justice is responsible for the Police Act. In order to ensure that an “adequate and effective” level of policing is maintained throughout the province, the Minister may (among other things):

- Liaise, consult, and co-operate with similar bodies across Canada to encourage uniformity in procedures, proceedings, standards, and any other matters relating to police services;
- Provide information and advice to boards, chief officers, and other police authorities about the management and operation of police departments as well as training, etc.; and
- Develop, approve, or deliver police training.

However, it is the provincial Cabinet that has the power to make regulations prescribing standards for the adequacy and effectiveness of policing services in Nova Scotia.

In British Columbia, by comparison, the Minister of Public Safety delegates responsibility for overseeing policing policies and standards to an appointed Director of Police Services. This Director reports to the Minister and may establish standards for:

- The training of people to become officers;
- The training and retraining of officers;
- The use of force;
- The promotion of unbiased policing and law enforcement services delivery; and
- Community consultation regarding the priorities, goals, and objectives for policing and law enforcement.

Saskatchewan is an example of a jurisdiction that has delegated the power to set policies and standards to a commission. In that Province, both the Minister and the Saskatchewan Police Commission are empowered to “promote” adequate and effective policing throughout the province, but it is the Commission that sets provincial standards for various aspects of policing, including training and discipline for all municipal police services in the province.

These examples from other jurisdictions provide a brief overview of who may be responsible for establishing policies and standards, as well as the scope of authority for what may be included in those policies and standards. They have informed the Final Recommendations that are put forward in this Report.

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89 (NS) Police Act, SNS 2004, c 31 at s 4.
90 Ibid, at s 6(a),(d) and (g).
91 i.e. The Lieutenant Governor, acting on the advice of Cabinet.
92 (NS) Police Act, s 97.
93 (BC) Police Act, RSBC 1996, c 367 at s 39(l).
94 Ibid, at s 40(l)(a.1).
“I want the public to feel safe with the RNC as your provincial police force. ... We need to be held accountable. ... We need oversight – any organization certainly does – and I welcome it. I’m open to it.” 97

—RNC Police Chief Patrick Roche, July 19, 2022

Reasons for Change

Without a police oversight board in Newfoundland and Labrador to address the glaring deficiencies in police accountability that are systemic in nature, the necessary change for building community trust in the police will be difficult, and perhaps even impossible, to achieve.

To ensure effective policing and public confidence, the recommended Police Oversight Board must be able, among other things, to establish (a) regulations on the use of force by police; (b) standards for the education, training, and conduct of police officers; (c) policies and procedures for investigating complaints of misconduct; and (d) other high-level governance policies for police forces. It is vital that these powers be vested in a civilian-led Police Oversight Board, as opposed to either police leadership or political actors, for several reasons.

First, the widespread problems that have been documented in the RNC Workplace Review clearly demonstrate the shortcomings of vesting critical management and business functions directly with the Chief of Police, as is currently the case. As that review noted, “the Chief serves both as the commanding officer of the force and the CEO of the business entity. How this dual structure interacts to support the RNC is complicated and sometimes confusing.” 98 Assigning the latter set of responsibilities to an elected official, such as the Minister of Justice and Public Safety, is no better. As an elected official, the Minister is expected to make decisions based on his or her party’s strategic political interests, rather than the absolute public good. For reasons of political convention, if not as a matter of law, the Minister is unable to provide specific operational direction to the police.

Second, the Minister of Justice and Public Safety is responsible for overseeing several complex branches of the Department, including several non-police entities such as Family Justice Services, the Civil Division of the Department of Justice and the general administration of the courts. Third, entwining the RNC’s management and business functions with ministerial responsibility has already jeopardized the independence of both the

97 See the NTV Evening Newshour for July 19, 2022, online: http://ntv.ca/rnc-chief-says-nine-recommendations-from-workplace-review-achievable/ (at 2:27).
98 RNC Workplace Review, p. 5.
police force and the Department of Justice and Public Safety. As the RNC Workplace Review points out, “the business functions of the RNC are deeply imbedded in the machinery of government with little or no independence in respect to its human resources, finances and physical plant (for example).” The obvious internal dysfunction of the RNC, and the evident inability of successive political actors to address it, is a direct result of this ill-conceived arrangement.

By contrast, the civilian-led Police Oversight Board that is being recommended in this Report would be politically neutral, sensitive to community expectations, and focused on a single set of issues and priorities. These factors would allow such a board to make sound decisions based purely in the public interest. The Police Oversight Board would also introduce some much-needed distance between the Chief of Police on the one hand, and the Minister and Department of Justice and Public Safety on the other. For this reason, the Police Oversight Board would be well positioned to address the challenges of accountability that exist within the current chain of command. In other words, this Report recommends that police leadership be left to focus on law enforcement while civilians with diverse perspectives assume leadership of the RNC’s management and business functions – an idea that already has at least some support among rank-and-file police officers, as the RNC Workplace Review revealed.

The nature of the Police Oversight Board that is being recommended by the Working Group would allow for decisions about policing in the province to reflect the needs and priorities of the public, as the Board would reflect the diversity of the public that it serves. The composition of the Manitoba Police Commission may be regarded as a starting point. Decisions with respect to appointments to that Commission, for example, must take into account the cultural and gender diversity of the province; and the legislation specifically requires that at least one member of a First Nation and one Métis person be on the Commission.

The composition of the Police Oversight Board that is being recommended by the Working Group would allow for decisions about policing in the province to reflect the needs and priorities of the public, as the Board would reflect the diversity of the public that it serves.

Recommendations

The intent of the Working Group, as set out in the detailed list of Final Recommendations at page 48, is to address the serious issues surrounding the lack of police accountability and oversight in Newfoundland and Labrador.

To move towards effective and positive change, one of the core Recommendations calls for the establishment of a Board of Commissioners for Police Oversight (“the Police Oversight Board”) in Newfoundland and Labrador. The Police Oversight Board

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99  RNC Workplace Review, p. 15.
100  ibid. It bears noting that the RNC Workplace Review does not specifically recommend the creation of a police oversight board “at this time” only because of the “urgency of some of the issues” that it documents. The Working Group agrees with Harriet Lewis’ suggestion that immediate action is required to address many of the problems that are documented in the RNC Workplace Review. However, these measures can and should be undertaken in parallel with the creation of a police oversight board to ensure that solutions remain in place over the longer term.
102  The Police Services Act, S.M. 2009, c. 32, s. 9(3) (“Manitoba PSA”).
must be empowered by statute to provide independent, civilian-led, proactive oversight of, and high-level direction to, both police forces that operate in the province (see Recommendations 1 to 1.2).

**Recommendation 1**

Establish a Board of Commissioners for Police Oversight ("the Police Oversight Board") in Newfoundland and Labrador.

**Recommendation 1.1**

The Police Oversight Board must be empowered by statute to provide independent, civilian-led, proactive oversight of, and high-level policy direction to, all police forces that operate in the province. This includes:

a. The Royal Newfoundland Constabulary ("the RNC");

b. Members of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police ("the RCMP") operating in Newfoundland and Labrador; and

c. Any Indigenous police forces that may be created in the future.

**Recommendation 1.2**

The Police Oversight Board must have all delegated authority commensurate with a regulatory tribunal, including the authority and the budgetary resources to:

a. Retain, train, and terminate any staff that are necessary to fulfilling its statutory mandate; and

b. Establish any appropriate branches or special offices to provide oversight in specific areas of policing or to address specific issues and priorities.
Strengthen the Public Complaints Commission in Newfoundland and Labrador

When experts talk about civilian-led oversight for addressing police misconduct, they often focus on two types of civilian-led disciplinary mechanisms, which differ depending on the severity of police misconduct. The first receives complaints from the public concerning a police officer’s non-criminal misconduct: these may be called complaints commissions, police commissions, or review boards, depending on the jurisdiction. The second investigates police officers whose actions have led to the serious injury or death of an individual, or when police officers are alleged to have committed a sexual offence, domestic violence, or any other matter of significant public interest: these are typically called serious incident response teams or independent investigative units.\(^{103}\) It is the first type discussed in this section. (The second type is addressed in the Group 4 Recommendations.)

In Canada, many police complaints bodies adopt an oversight and disciplinary model that is premised on police themselves investigating complaints about police misconduct within their own ranks. This self-investigative type of complaints body has drawn criticism because police may be unable to put aside biases when investigating fellow officers.\(^ {104}\) In some jurisdictions, however, there has been a shift towards more autonomy, with independent bodies increasingly conducting their own civilian-led investigations and hearing complaints about police conduct.\(^ {105}\) However, that is not the case for the public complaints commission in Newfoundland and Labrador.


\(^{104}\) Ibid, Who Polices the Police?

\(^{105}\) Models of Civilian Police Review, at 58.
An example of true civilian-led police oversight is the New Zealand Independent Police Conduct Authority (the "NZ Authority"). The website for the NZ Authority emphasizes that: "We are totally independent: We’re headed by a Judge and don’t answer to the police, the government or anyone else about our findings." The NZ Authority does, however, have a blended team of investigators with both "policing and non-policing backgrounds". According to the Independent Police Conduct Authority Act 1988, the Commissioner of Police ("the Commissioner") must notify the NZ Authority of every complaint received by the police and of every police incident involving death or serious bodily harm.

The NZ Authority has a blended team of investigators with both "policing and non-policing backgrounds".

Public Complaints Commissions in Newfoundland and Labrador

In Newfoundland and Labrador there are two separate complaints bodies: one for the RNC and one for the RCMP. The CRCC is the commission that receives and conducts reviews of civilian complaints concerning the conduct of RCMP officers.

The RNC PCC acts as a registrar for complaints made against members of the RNC and ensures that they are dealt with in accordance with the RNC Act. Any person other than a police officer or a person employed in the RNC may file a complaint concerning the conduct of a police officer or the operational policies and procedures of the RNC. In order to make a complaint, the person must have been directly affected by the conduct or policies and procedures in question.

The RNC PCC consists of a Commissioner, appointed by the provincial Cabinet who supervises and directs Minister-appointed officers, investigators, and other employees. Upon receiving a complaint, the Commissioner engages the Chief of Police to conduct an investigation in order to determine if the complaint has merit. If the complaint is found to be substantiated, the Chief or Deputy Chief may take any of the following actions:

- Settle the matter directly with the complainant;
- Discipline any police officers who are the subject of the complaint; or
- Take any other action that is considered appropriate.

Alternatively, if the Chief or Deputy Chief determines that the complaint is not substantiated, then it may be dismissed without any further action being taken. However, if the Chief or Deputy Chief renders such a decision, the complainant may appeal the decision to the Commissioner.

If either the Chief or Deputy Chief determines that it is in the public interest to do so, a complaint may be referred back to the RNC PCC to conduct its own investigation. In the event that the RNC PCC does not...
reach a settlement of the complaint with the complainant, the Commissioner may refer the matter to an adjudicator. The same process may be used if a police officer appeals a disciplinary decision and the Chief or Deputy Chief has imposed a penalty that includes a suspension without pay for two weeks or longer, dismissal, or demotion. Parties may appeal an order of the adjudicator or the RNC PCC to the trial division of the Supreme Court of Newfoundland and Labrador.

Complaints Commissions in Other Jurisdictions

In Nova Scotia, the Office of the Police Complaints Commissioner (“OPCC”) investigates complaints by citizens alleging misconduct by municipal police officers. After its investigation, the OPCC decides either to discipline the officer or that no further action with respect to the complaint is necessary. If the complainant is not satisfied with the decision of the OPCC, the complainant can request to have the matter referred to the Nova Scotia Police Review Board (the “NS Review Board”); which is established under the provincial Police Act and is empowered to hear and rule on public complainant appeals.

The NS Review Board comprises at least three people who are appointed by the provincial Cabinet and who each hold office for one three-year term (members of the Board may be reappointed). The Chair or Co-Chair of the Review Board must hold a bachelor’s degree in law, or an equivalent degree as determined by the Governor in Council. The Minister of Justice may direct the Review Board to investigate, inquire into, and report upon any matter relating to the extent, investigation, or control of crime; the enforcement of law; and the operation and administration of a police department. Any report issuing from any Review Board investigation must be presented to both the Minister and the municipal board of the police service concerned.

In Manitoba, The Law Enforcement Review Agency (“LERA”) receives and investigates public complaints concerning alleged misconduct of municipal police officers. The provincial Cabinet appoints a Commissioner who investigates all complaints made in accordance with the Manitoba Law Enforcement Review Act. The Commissioner is permitted to use all necessary resources and persons for investigative purposes; however, no member of the police service against which a complaint is made may participate in the investigation. Where the Commissioner, during the course of an investigation, determines that a police service practice or policy was a contributing cause or factor to the alleged police officer wrongdoing, the Commissioner may make recommendations to rectify any flaws in the organizational or administrative practice or policy.

Reasons for Change

In Newfoundland and Labrador, the current mechanism for handling public complaints directly engages the RNC Chief of Police. Upon receiving a complaint, the Commissioner refers it to the RNC Chief of Police who performs the

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117 Ibid at s. 28(2).
118 Ibid at s. 28(3).
119 Ibid at s. 36(1).
120 See Office of the Police Complaints Commissioner mission statement: https://novascotia.ca/opcc/.
121 (NS) Police Act, SNS 2004, c 31 at s. 13(1), (4).
122 Ibid at s. 19(1).
123 Ibid at s. 25.
124 Ibid, s. 22.
125 LERA was established under The Law Enforcement Review Act, R.S.M. 1987, c. L75.
initial investigation\textsuperscript{127} and who has the power to decide whether to dismiss the complaint.\textsuperscript{128} The very model that is meant to facilitate the accountability of police officers necessarily places the Chief of Police into an inherent conflict of interest, whether real or perceived, where he or she must always weigh the competing demands of justice against the likely desire to maintain a favourable public image of the force.

\textit{The very model that is meant to facilitate the accountability of police officers necessarily places the Chief of Police into an inherent conflict of interest, whether real or perceived, where he or she must always weigh the competing demands of justice against the likely desire to maintain a favourable public image of the force.}

The RNC Act places an uneven burden on complainants to file their complaint, requiring them to file a complaint within 6 months of the incident at issue.\textsuperscript{129} However, the RNC Act places no reciprocal timeline or burden on the RNC Chief of Police to address the complaint. This type of system is clearly ineffective. With respect to the RCMP, in some cases it took so long for complaints to be addressed that the complainants had already died or the officer involved had since retired.\textsuperscript{130} With respect to the RNC, perhaps the most egregious example is that of a St. John’s man who still had not received a decision on his complaint seven years after filing it with the RNC PCC.\textsuperscript{131}

It is hardly surprising, therefore, that the RNC has often failed when it has been tasked with policing the behaviour of its own officers. This is apparent in the disturbing example of Roxanne Greene, a resident of Labrador City whose ex-husband is a sergeant with the RNC. In August 2021, Greene shared with CBC that despite making multiple complaints over the course of several years about ongoing abuse by her ex-husband, no action was ever taken to protect her. On the contrary, as Greene shared with CBC, members of the RNC would gaslight her, denying that she was being stalked and harassed by her ex-husband. One senior officer even tried to dissuade her from making any complaints at all, accusing her of “messing with a man’s career.”\textsuperscript{132} This example highlights the problematic nature of the RNC PCC, which does not provide an independent process for members of the public to make a complaint without fear of harassment or reprisal.

Unfortunately, the RNC PCC has no jurisdiction to investigate complaints of misconduct made against members of the RCMP. Instead, this responsibility belongs to the CRCC, a federal organization.\textsuperscript{133} With more than half of all police officers in the province serving with the RCMP, this means that no provincial public complaints body\textsuperscript{134} plays any role in ensuring that they remain accountable to the communities they are meant to serve.\textsuperscript{135}

When an individual has a concern about the conduct of an RCMP officer, the individual

\textsuperscript{127} RNC Act, s. 24(3).
\textsuperscript{128} See sections 18 to 25 of the RNC Act.
\textsuperscript{129} Ibid at s. 22(6). While the 6-month timeline may be extended in certain circumstances, the burden is on the complainant to prove that an extension should apply: see s. 22(8).
\textsuperscript{133} The Serious Incident Response Team of Newfoundland and Labrador does have jurisdiction to investigate serious incidents involving members of the RCMP.
\textsuperscript{134} For an overview of the jurisdiction of the CRCC, see Civilian Review and Complaints Commission for the RCMP: Jurisdiction of the Commission, online: https://www.crcc-ccetp.gc.ca/en/jurisdiction.
can make a complaint to the CRCC. The CRCC receives the complaint, ensures it is put in writing and then sends it to the RCMP for investigation. If a complainant is not satisfied with the RCMP’s investigation, the complainant can request that the CRCC conduct a review of the RCMP’s initial investigation. If it receives a request for review, the CRCC then requests from the RCMP all relevant information regarding the complaint; and then CRCC analysts examine the information from the complainant and RCMP. The CRCC may agree or disagree with the RCMP’s initial findings. In its reports, the CRCC makes its own findings and may make recommendations aimed at improving RCMP conduct and national policing policies. In other words, when a member of the public submits a complaint about misconduct by an RCMP officer, the very first stage of the investigation is for the RCMP to investigate itself.

Further, the existence of two separate complaints commissions in the province adds an additional layer of bureaucracy that members of the public must navigate in order to file a complaint against a police officer for any alleged misconduct.

When a member of the public submits a complaint about misconduct by an RCMP officer, the very first stage of the investigation is for the RCMP to investigate itself.

**Recommendations**

The Recommendations call for the procedure for public complaints against police officers to be strengthened and streamlined (see Recommendation 3).

The Recommendations seek to address the police oversight reform needed in Newfoundland and Labrador, which includes ensuring that police officers are held accountable for their actions, regardless of whether they serve as members of the RNC or the RCMP. To improve the process for filing complaints, the Recommendations call for complaints against members of the RCMP operating in Newfoundland and Labrador to be brought under the single jurisdiction of the RNC PCC (see Recommendation 3.8).

The Working Group understands that bringing the RCMP officers stationed in the province under the jurisdiction of the RNC PCC would require, at minimum, amendments to applicable federal and provincial legislation and the existing federal-provincial policing agreement.

Implementing the Recommendations would reform the public complaints process in Newfoundland and Labrador by eliminating the self-investigative type of process that is currently in place for the initial investigation of a public complaints, and transition the RNC PCC to be more transparent and completely neutral and independent of police forces and Ministerial appointments. The full list of Recommendations are at page 48.

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**Recommendation 3**

Strengthen and streamline the procedure for public complaints against police officers.

**Recommendation 3.8**

The process of filing a complaint against a police officer must be streamlined by amending the Agreement for Policing in the Province Act, 1990, in order to bring members of the RCMP operating in the province under the jurisdiction of the RNC PCC. The jurisdiction of the Civilian Review and Complaints Commission for the RCMP (the “CRCC”) in Newfoundland and Labrador must be abolished.

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Group 4 Recommendations

Improving the Serious Incident Response Team in Newfoundland and Labrador

Independent investigative bodies (or units) are provincial entities that are responsible for conducting independent investigations into serious incidents involving the police. The purpose of these investigations is to determine whether an offence has occurred under federal or provincial law.

In Newfoundland and Labrador, serious incidents involving police are investigated by the Serious Incident Response Team ("SIRT-NL"). The Serious Incident Response Team Act ("SIRTA") is the legislation governing SIRT-NL and applies to both the RNC and the RCMP. The provincial Cabinet appoints the civilian Director of SIRT-NL, who cannot be a current or former police officer in any jurisdiction, for a term not exceeding 5 years. The Director may be reappointed for one additional term.

The Director is responsible to the Minister of Justice and Public Safety for:

- The direction of SIRT-NL as well as the police officers and other resources assigned to it;
- The direction of investigations and reporting of serious incidents involving police officers;
- The administration of SIRT-NL’s budget; and
- The discharge of other duties and functions assigned under the SIRTA or its regulations.

In consultation with the Director of Public Prosecutions, the Director has the authority under the SIRTA to lay charges against police officers when the evidence gathered during an investigation forms grounds to believe that an offence has been committed.

The provincial Cabinet may, on the recommendation of the Director, appoint the investigators necessary for the purpose of assisting SIRT-NL. Such investigators are a blend of both civilian investigators and investigators seconded from the RNC and the RCMP. Alternatively, the Minister may direct a chief officer to select qualified police officers and other resources from the RNC, the RCMP, or another police service, to assist SIRT-NL.

The Director has discretionary power to appoint a community liaison, or observer, to work with SIRT-NL during an investigation. Newfoundland and Labrador has a diverse population and is the traditional territory of different Indigenous Peoples who still reside here. For these reasons, it should be mandatory for community liaisons to be appointed to monitor investigations whenever Indigenous people or communities are affected by a SIRT-NL investigation.

The Director and investigators acting under the SIRTA have all the powers, duties,
and immunities of a peace officer and constable at common law or under any Act. \footnote{Ibid, s. 9(a).} They also have jurisdiction throughout the province while conducting those duties and exercising those powers. \footnote{Ibid, s. 9(b).} All investigative decision-making, including the decision to issue a public report, lay a charge, or refer a matter to Crown counsel, is made independently of the government. \footnote{Justice and Safety: SIRT.}

Although SIRT-NL is less than 2 years old, it has already faced criticism from women’s groups and others as being poorly equipped to conduct investigations into alleged sexual offences in particular. \footnote{CBC News. N.L police watchdog vows to build trust, not force investigation into RNC allegation. July 30, 2021. Online: https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/newfoundland-and-labrador/sirt-nl-trauma-informed-listening-sexual-assault-1.6114424 ["N.L police watchdog vows to build trust"].} For this reason, the Working Group has reviewed an independent investigation unit from another jurisdiction to help inform its Recommendations.

**Independent Investigative Units in Other Jurisdictions**

In 2021, the Government of Saskatchewan introduced the **Police (Serious Incident Response Team) Amendment Act, 2021**. \footnote{That Act can be found online: https://pubsaskdev.blob.core.windows.net/pubsask-prod/127585/Chap-22-2021.pdf; also see: https://pubsaskdev.blob.core.windows.net/pubsask-prod/126626/Bill-26-2021.pdf.} Those amendments ensure that the Saskatchewan SIRT includes Indigenous representation, by requiring the appointment of an Indigenous community liaison if the victim involved in the serious incident is of Indigenous ancestry. Such Indigenous liaisons will assist the executive director of the SIRT and assist with coordinating with the family of the victim. Those amendments also provide the option for the executive director to appoint an Indigenous community liaison in all other matters. \footnote{See: https://www.saskatchewan.ca/government/news-and-media/2021/april/12/province-introduces-civilian-led-and-independent-model-for-police-oversight.}

Recent changes to the independent investigative unit in Manitoba also offer guidance in strengthening accountability of, and trust in, SIRT-NL. In 2015, Manitoba’s Independent Investigation Unit (“IIU”) became operative. That IIU is headed by a civilian director who cannot be a current or former police officer and is appointed by the provincial Cabinet. In addition, a civilian monitor may be appointed by the Manitoba Police Commission to oversee specific investigations. The civilian director is assisted by a group of investigators who may be current or former police officers or civilians with investigative experience who meet the following set of requirements. They must: (1) be a Canadian citizen or permanent resident; (2) have experience in major crime investigations, in the case of a person who is a current or former police officer; and (3) have experience in conducting and managing a wide range of complex investigations, in the case of a person who is not a current or former police officer. \footnote{Man. Reg. 99/2015 – Independent Investigations Regulation, s. 3.}

Any civilian monitor appointed to oversee an IIU investigation must receive training, which is arranged by the Police Commission. \footnote{The Police Services Act, S. M. 2009, c. 32, s. 69(2).} (Neither the Act nor regulations indicate what, if any, training is provided to civilian investigators with the IIU.)

When an investigation is completed, the Crown prosecutor may be asked to provide an opinion on whether the officer should be charged. However, the civilian director may
also lay charges. Although public release of the findings of investigations is not legally required, the IIU typically issues news releases advising on whether an investigation is underway and what the outcome of the investigation may have been. In the 2019-2020 fiscal year, the IIU opened 63 investigations and laid 17 charges. This means that 27% of the total investigations resulted in charges.\(^\text{155}\)

There have been criticisms made against the Manitoba IIU, including a lack of diversity, not enough transparency, and conflicts of interest when police investigate police.\(^\text{156}\) Manitoba has taken steps to address some of these issues with their IIU by bringing forward new legislation.\(^\text{157}\) The following are some of the proposed changes:

- Establishing a position within the IIU to ensure Indigenous organizations, community leaders, and affected people and their family members are directly engaged throughout the course of an investigation;
- Replacing the Civilian Monitor Program with a Community Liaison Program to allow the appointment of designated individuals from affected communities or organizations to work with the IIU to provide a direct connection between the investigation and the community, and ensure the investigation is conducted with respect and sensitivity;
- Discontinuing the practice of seconding serving police officers to serve on the IIU while employed by a police agency;
- Implementing penalties for police officers that fail to comply with the legislation (duty to comply and notification obligations); and
- Enhancing transparency by prescribing IIU public reporting requirements.\(^\text{158}\)

Manitoba’s proposed amendments to its IIU are an example that the Government of Newfoundland and Labrador can look to for guidance on how best to move forward with improving accountability and oversight mechanisms. Were similar changes to be implemented in this province, they would be closely aligned with the Recommendations that the Working Group is putting forward in this Report in relation to SIRT-NL.

**Reasons for Change**

The composition of SIRT-NL has recently been flagged by women who have come forward alleging they were assaulted by on-duty members of the RNC. According to media reports, survivors are hesitant to make formal complaints because they “don’t want to take their allegations to police, and advocates for sexual assault survivors say there’s no trust in SIRT-NL, as two of SIRT’s three-member team are seconded police officers.”\(^\text{159}\) Under this approach, it is difficult to hold police accountable and maintain a sense of justice and safety in the community. Having trust in the oversight body that investigates police criminal misconduct is critical, otherwise complainants may not come forward with their allegations. Particularly in the case of sexual offences, there is a clear risk that different standards of justice will be applied to police officers if critical changes are not implemented.

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159 See N.L police watchdog vows to build trust.
According to media reports, survivors are hesitant to make formal complaints because they “don’t want to take their allegations to police, and advocates for sexual assault survivors say there’s no trust in SIRT-NL, as two of SIRT’s three-member team are seconded police officers.”

Section 8 of the SIRTA seems to recognize the problematic nature of police investigating police. That section provides that if a police officer is assigned to assist in an investigation of a fellow officer from the same police force, the investigative officer shall not perform the role of lead investigator or team commander in the investigation. However, this restriction does not go far enough, as it still permits situations in which an officer can be investigated by a fellow officer from the same police force. It also does nothing to address the inherent problem of trust when it comes to seconded police officers.

The lack of diversity among independent investigation units is a problem across Canada. Independent research conducted by The Canadian Press found that of 167 members involved in provincial independent investigation units across the country, 118 are men (71%) and 111 are either former police officers or have had a working relationship with the police (66%). That research also revealed that only 20 of the 167 – a mere 12% – identify as a visible minority or person of colour. Given Canada’s diverse population, the independent investigation units across the country do not adequately represent the communities they serve. The same Canadian Press research also revealed that SIRT-NL has no people of colour working as investigators.


162 See Police Watchdog Tally.
Independent research conducted by The Canadian Press found that of 167 members involved in provincial independent investigation units across the country, 118 are men (71%) and 111 are either former police officers or have had a working relationship with the police (66%). That research also revealed that only 20 of the 167 – a mere 12% – identify as a visible minority or person of colour.

Recommendations

Given the self-investigative structure of SIRT-NL and the public concerns that have been raised about it, the Recommendations aim to strengthen the public’s confidence in SIRT-NL by ensuring its complete independence from police forces in the province (see Recommendation 4).

To achieve independence from the police forces in the province and to build trust and confidence with the public, SIRT-NL must immediately begin the transition to a civilian-led investigative team. This will mean moving away from the practice of seconding police officers to conduct investigations into serious incidents involving police. Wherever possible, SIRT-NL must favour the use of appropriately trained civilian investigators with no prior police experience, along with a minimum of former police officers needed to ensure investigative competence (see Recommendation 4.1).

Communities in the province deserve a model that suits our context in Newfoundland and Labrador, including Indigenous communities that deserve and require an investigative unit that reflects their unique cultures and needs. To begin addressing the lack of diverse representation of SIRT-NL investigators, and to improve transparency, the Working Group’s Recommendations would have SIRT-NL immediately adopt a standard practice of appointing community liaisons to monitor and report on all investigations into police negligence and misconduct. As part of this, SIRT-NL needs to work with community organizations and stakeholders – particularly women; Black, Indigenous and people of colour; and other marginalized groups – to develop and train a roster of readily available community liaisons that can facilitate this monitoring and reporting (see Recommendations 4.2 and 4.3).

Recommendation 4

Strengthen the public’s confidence in the Serious Incident Response Team of Newfoundland and Labrador (“SIRT-NL”) by ensuring its complete independence from police forces in the province.

Recommendation 4.1

SIRT-NL must immediately begin the transition to a truly civilian-led investigative team. This will mean moving away from the practice of seconding police officers to conduct investigations into serious incidents involving police. SIRT-NL’s investigative team must instead consist of trained civilian investigators, with no prior police experience, along with a minimum of former police officers needed to ensure investigative competence.

Recommendation 4.2

In the interest of transparency, SIRT-NL must adopt a standard practice of appointing community liaisons under section 12(f) of the Serious Incident Response Team Act, 2017, to monitor and report on all investigations into police negligence and misconduct, especially in cases involving racialized and other marginalized groups as well as cases involving sexual assault and/or domestic violence.

Recommendation 4.3

SIRT-NL must work with community organizations and stakeholders – particularly women; Black, Indigenous, and People of Colour (BIPOC); and other systematically marginalized groups – to develop and maintain a roster of readily available community liaisons. All such community liaisons must be provided with appropriate training and receive fair compensation for their time.
Group 5 Recommendations

5.1 Undertake a Review of All Other Oversight Mechanisms

Besides formally organized police forces, there are other public enforcement entities in Newfoundland and Labrador which exercise police-like powers, sometimes with deadly results. The Working Group recognizes that these other entities require robust oversight, including but not necessarily limited to: (a) correctional officers; (b) fisheries and wildlife officers; and (c) municipal enforcement officers (see Recommendation 5.1).

These types of officials – some of whom have the lawful authority to exercise lethal force – must not be able to escape scrutiny and accountability for their actions. While this Report is directed at oversight mechanisms in the province related specifically to police forces, it is critical that the Province carry out a review of the oversight mechanisms that may be in place to regulate all other entities that are able to exercise police-like powers. Such a review should be done in parallel with the work required to address the oversight issues that have already been identified in this Report.

(a) Correctional Officers

Much like police forces, prisons in Canada tend to have challenges arising from jurisdictional division. There are correctional centres that fall within both federal and provincial jurisdictions, and each has their own complaints process. At the federal level there is the Office of the Correctional Investigator (“OCI”). That complaints process, however, does not deal with complaints from “provincial offenders”.163

Provincial prisons are in dire need of oversight. Inmates in prisons in Newfoundland and Labrador have made allegations that guards regularly mete out summary discipline that goes well beyond their discretionary powers under the law, calling such disciplinary processes a “kangaroo court”.164 There were 254 hearings held in provincial jails over a three-month period in late 2021, with over 80% of the cases resulting in the inmate being found guilty. No lawyers were present at any of these hearings. In one example, prison staff refused an inmate his prescribed medications. After attempting to hoard his medicine, he received 30 days’ worth of sanctions, including segregation from other inmates and 20 days of lost privileges such as exercise and outdoor time.165

Recommendation 5.1

The Province should immediately undertake a review of all other oversight mechanisms that currently exist for non-police organizations and personnel that are able to exercise police-like powers, with the goal of identifying regulatory gaps and proposing legislation to ensure full accountability. Such a review must include, without necessarily being limited to, the following:

a. Wardens, guards, and other prison officials;

b. Fisheries and wildlife officers; and

c. Municipal Enforcement Officers.

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165 Ibid.
There were 254 hearings held in provincial jails over a three-month period in late 2021, with over 80% of the cases resulting in the inmate being found guilty. No lawyers were present at any of these hearings.

The Correctional Services Act provides few options for recourse, specifying only that the provincial Cabinet has the power to appoint a Chief Superintendent and Superintendents for prisons, who have plenary power how the facility is run. This lack of robust oversight can be lethal. Ten correctional officers working at His Majesty’s Penitentiary in St. John’s recently faced charges ranging from manslaughter to criminal negligence causing death in the case of Jonathan Henoche, an Inuk inmate at the prison who suffered from fetal alcohol syndrome. After Crown prosecutors failed to bring enough evidence, however, all ten correctional officers saw their charges dropped in relation to Henoche’s death. His lawyer and family are now seeking a public inquiry and are suing the provincial government for negligence leading to his death.

(b) Fisheries and Wildlife Officers

The Department of Fisheries and Oceans Canada (“DFO”) has officers who enforce the Fisheries Act. They could be described as “Canada’s fishing police”. Following the Supreme Court of Canada decision of R v Marshall in 1999, the right to harvest and sell fish was affirmed for the Mi’kmaw people. The decision led to conflict between non-Indigenous and Mi’kmaq fishers in New Brunswick and Nova Scotia. Despite the Mi’kmaq fishing within their legally recognized Treaty rights, conflict broke out between them and non-Indigenous fishers near Burnt Church First Nation. There, DFO officers used government vessels to ram and sink Mi’kmaq fishing boats, seize traps, and run over Mi’kmaq fishers who were in the water. In her documentary titled Is the Crown at war with us?, Alanis Obomsawin notes that despite video evidence showing these abuses of power, the RCMP investigation into DFO conduct found “no proof of wrongdoing”.

There is currently no independent oversight of DFO. The only oversight that exists is the department’s own internal chain of command and the RCMP – mechanisms that were clearly insufficient for responding to the Burnt Church Crisis. Use-of-force issues, and any resulting complaints, face an internal DFO review conducted by individual supervisors, chiefs, directors-general, and the minister.

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167 Ibid, sections 6, 17, 19, 48.
174 Now more commonly known as Esgenoôpetitj First Nation.
(c) Municipal Enforcement Officers

The Working Group has also identified Municipal Enforcement Officers as a group that requires stronger oversight. These officers act as public safety officers and, much like RCMP and RNC officers, there is often room for them to behave in ways that endanger the public they are charged to serve. Such is the example of one Happy Valley–Goose Bay officer who was seen in video footage violently throwing a handcuffed Inuk man to the ground, triggering outrage in the community.\textsuperscript{177}

In this specific instance, the town of Happy Valley–Goose Bay hired a law firm which then contracted an independent investigator to look into the arrest. The investigation found no wrongdoing on the part of municipal enforcement officer Larry Baker, but critics have been vocal about the lack of transparency in the investigation.\textsuperscript{178}

\textbf{“The only way we are ever going to stop RCMP racism and brutality against Indigenous Peoples is to declassify, deconstruct and defund the institution itself.”}\textsuperscript{182}

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—Dr. Pam Palmater, Chair in Indigenous Governance, Toronto Metropolitan (formerly Ryerson) University
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\textsuperscript{180} Morin, Brandi. ‘No one is going to believe you’: When the RCMP abuses Indigenous women and girls. Aljazeera. December 29, 2021. Online: https://www.aljazeera.com/features/longform/2021/12/29/no-one-will-believe-you-when-the-rcmp-abuses-indigenous-girls [“No one is going to believe you”].

\textsuperscript{181} Ibid, No one is going to believe you.

\textsuperscript{182} Palmater, Pam.Canada should declassify, deconstruct and defund the RCMP. June 2020. Online: https://canadiandimension.com/articles/view/declassify-deconstruct-and-defund-the-rcmp [“Deconstruct the RCMP”].
Indigenous victims are stereotypically portrayed and stigmatized by the RCMP as drug addicts, prostitutes, and runaways, even when the RCMP has information that suggests otherwise.

In Newfoundland and Labrador, one Indigenous woman, Deidre Michelin, repeatedly called the RCMP for help on the day she was murdered, but the nearest RCMP detachment was 160 kilometres away and help did not arrive in time.\(^\text{183}\)

The RCMP also faces criticism across the country stemming from its paramilitary style which works counter to building the community connections that are needed for effective and safe policing. Relatedly, the RCMP has frequently been criticized for abusing and intimidating Indigenous people. In the Labrador context, one Indigenous land protector has commented that peaceful protests were being met with heavy-handed and excessive police presence.\(^\text{184}\) Similar stories were submitted to the MMIWG Inquiry, detailing how RCMP officers – unprovoked – suddenly moved in and physically dragged away three Indigenous individuals that were peacefully protesting on their traditional territory.\(^\text{185}\) One of those people was a woman who was taken into custody, away from her community, without notice to her family and friends.\(^\text{186}\)

The inherent cross-jurisdictional challenges in these cases make such issues nearly impossible to resolve at the provincial level. Because the RCMP is a federal police force governed by federal legislation, any provincial civilian oversight body will be limited in its powers to hold the RCMP accountable, at least as compared to the RNC. This is but one reason why contract policing by the RCMP needs to be phased out in Newfoundland and Labrador following the full implementation of the Group 1-4 Recommendations (see Recommendation 5.2).

There have been calls to deconstruct and defund the RCMP due to “the numerous investigations, commissions, inquiries, individual civil actions, class action lawsuits, and horrifying statistics [...]” that have not cured the systemic racism within the RCMP.\(^\text{187}\) In 2019 the federal government created a new civilian advisory board, separate from the CRCC, for the purpose of advising the RCMP on how best to address problems within its own ranks, such as harassment and other systemic workplace culture and management issues. However, “like most of the other accountability mechanisms, it doesn’t have the power to compel the RCMP to make changes.”\(^\text{188}\)

Recommendation 5.2

Provided the above measures are implemented, the Province should work to phase out contract policing by the RCMP in Newfoundland and Labrador by 2030.

\(^\text{183}\) https://www.cbc.ca/missingandmurdered/


\(^\text{186}\) Ibid, paragraph 41.

\(^\text{187}\) Ibid, paragraph 41.

\(^\text{188}\) Deconstruct the RCMP.

\(^\text{188}\) Gerster, Jane. The Dark Side of the RCMP: The mystique that has helped cement the RCMP as a national symbol is also what renders it particularly, stubbornly difficult to reform, The Walrus. October 2021. Online: https://thewalrus.ca/can-the-rcmp-be-saved/# [“The Dark Side of the RCMP”].
Because the RCMP is a federal police force governed by federal legislation, any provincial civilian oversight body will be limited in its powers to hold the RCMP accountable, at least as compared to the RNC. This is but one reason why contract policing by the RCMP needs to be phased out in Newfoundland and Labrador following the full implementation of the Group 1-4 Recommendations.

The CRCC, which is the commission that receives and conducts reviews of civilian complaints concerning misconduct by RCMP officers, has raised concerns about the RCMP oversight mechanisms.\textsuperscript{189} Whenever a member of the public raises concerns of misconduct by an RCMP officer, the local detachment investigates the complaint first. Only if the complainant is not satisfied with the findings of that initial investigation can the complaint then be turned over to the CRCC. In a report from late 2021, the RCMP announced that it had cleared its backlog of complaints, but not before some of the complainants had died.\textsuperscript{190}

In 2018 an Auditor General’s report\textsuperscript{191} on the many lawsuits against the RCMP found that the RCMP is more concerned about protecting its image than it is dealing with abusers in the force. In that report, the Auditor General also noted that no RCMP officer has been dismissed for misconduct, despite 85 civil actions against the force.\textsuperscript{192}

Ultimately, the RCMP are unwilling to reform, and perhaps are not even capable of reforming, the systemic racism within itself as an institution. Promises to undertake reviews or to implement piecemeal reforms are no longer acceptable. As Dr. Pam Palmater puts it: “No one has time for ‘important first steps’ or ‘best efforts’ anymore.”\textsuperscript{193}

\textsuperscript{189} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{192} Deconstruct the RCMP.
\textsuperscript{193} Deconstruct the RCMP.
Conclusion

This Final Report details critical flaws in the overall system of police oversight in Newfoundland and Labrador, including the public complaints process and the Serious Incident Response Team. This Report details the challenges in addressing such inadequacies through existing police oversight mechanisms, including systemic issues within the RNC and the RCMP. But it also proposes solutions by drawing on the MMIWG Calls for Justice, including the creation of a new civilian-led police oversight board in Newfoundland and Labrador.

This Final Report, and the Recommendations included herein, have been prepared by the First Voice Working Group on Police Oversight with a view towards laying the groundwork for implementing more effective and transparent civilian oversight of policing in Newfoundland and Labrador. Now that the Working Group has charted a path forward, it is time for the Government of Newfoundland and Labrador to act to implement these Recommendations.
Appendices
Appendix A: Calls for Justice

5.7 We call upon federal and provincial governments to establish robust and well-funded Indigenous civilian police oversight bodies (or branches within established reputable civilian oversight bodies within a jurisdiction) in all jurisdictions, which must include representation of Indigenous women, girls, and 2SLGBTQQIA people, inclusive of diverse Indigenous cultural backgrounds, with the power to:

i. Observe and oversee investigations in relation to police negligence or misconduct, including but not limited to rape and other sexual offences;

ii. Observe and oversee investigations of cases involving Indigenous Peoples; and

iii. Publicly report on police progress in addressing findings and recommendations at least annually.

9.2 We call upon all actors in the justice system, including police services, to build respectful working relationships with Indigenous Peoples by knowing, understanding, and respecting the people they are serving. Initiatives and actions should include, but are not limited to, the following measures:

i. Review and revise all policies, practices, and procedures to ensure service delivery that is culturally appropriate and reflects no bias or racism toward Indigenous Peoples, including victims and survivors of violence;

ii. Establish engagement and partnerships with Indigenous Peoples, communities, and leadership, including women, Elders, youth, and 2SLGBTQQIA people from the respective territories and who are resident within a police service’s jurisdiction;

iii. Ensure appropriate Indigenous representation, including Indigenous women, girls, and 2SLGBTQQIA people, on police services boards and oversight authorities; and

iv. Undertake training and education of all staff and officers so that they understand and implement culturally appropriate and trauma-informed practices, especially when dealing with families of missing and murdered Indigenous women, girls, and 2SLGBTQQIA people.

Appendix B: Working Group Terms of Reference

These terms of reference were adopted on April 29, 2021. They were last updated on July 6, 2022.

PURPOSE
The purpose of the First Voice Working Group on Police Oversight (the “Working Group”) is to develop a provincial framework for implementing Calls for Justice 5.7 and 9.2(iii) of the National Inquiry into Missing and Murdered Indigenous Women and Girls (“MMIWG”).

These two Calls for Justice urge federal, provincial, and territorial governments to establish robust and well-funded civilian-led oversight authorities of police services within their own jurisdictions. They also call on all actors at all levels of the justice system to work together to ensure adequate and appropriate representation of Indigenous Peoples, women, and 2SLGBTQQIA people within all such oversight authorities.

The Working Group will advance action in these areas by bringing together First Voice Partners, Contributors, and Supporters along with community members, government representatives, and other stakeholders to discuss, debate, and develop a set of recommendations to strengthen civilian oversight of police services in Newfoundland and Labrador.

MANDATE
The Working Group is constituted under First Voice’s own Terms of Reference and is accountable to the First Voice Partnership Table. In pursuing its purpose, the Working Group shall strive to be fully inclusive of Black, Indigenous, and People of Colour (BIPOC) as well as women and 2SLGBTQQIA people.

SCOPE OF WORK
The Working Group will consider improvements to all mechanisms of civilian oversight of the Royal Newfoundland Constabulary (“RNC”) and the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (“RCMP”) in relation to its operations within the Province of Newfoundland and Labrador. This includes:

- The Royal Newfoundland Constabulary Public Complaints Commission (“RNC PCC”);
- The Civilian Review and Complaints Commission for the RCMP (“CRCC”); and
- The Serious Incident Response Team of Newfoundland and Labrador (“SIRT-NL”).

The Working Group may also consider the creation of additional oversight mechanisms, such as police boards or commissions, as appropriate.

The Working Group will limit its Scope of Work to police forces operating within the province. It will not consider new or existing oversight mechanisms in relation to other entities that exercise police-like enforcement powers, such as:

- Correctional Officers;
- Fisheries and Wildlife Officers; or
- Municipal Enforcement Officers.

While the focus of the Working Group shall be the jurisdiction of the Province of Newfoundland and Labrador, it may consider both policy and legislative recommendations directed at any level of government that has the power to implement them.

DELIVERABLES
The Working Group is responsible for overseeing the production, review, approval, and publication of the following documents:

- A Draft Report, which will include (1) a legislative review of existing civilian-led oversight mechanisms in Newfoundland and Labrador; and
(2) an environmental scan of civilian-led oversight mechanisms that are already in place in other relevant common-law jurisdictions.

- A Final Report, which will include specific recommendations in line with MMIWG 5.7 and 9.2(iii) for strengthening civilian oversight of police services in Newfoundland and Labrador.

Final versions of both documents will be made publicly available on the First Voice website and any other appropriate channels by no later than December 15, 2022.

COMPOSITION

i. Membership

The following organizations are Permanent Members of the Working Group:
- First Light: St. John's Friendship Centre (Co-Chair)
- St. John's Status of Women Council (Co-Chair)
- Newfoundland and Labrador Human Rights Commission
- Provincial Advisory Council on the Status of Women
- Safe Harbour Outreach Project
- YWCA St. John's

All members of the First Voice Partnership Table shall be ex officio Permanent Members of the Working Group.

In addition, Permanent Members of the Working Group may from time to time invite other organizational stakeholders as well as non-affiliated individuals to participate in the Working Group. Such participants may serve either as contributing Associate Members or as non-contributing Observers.

ii. Decision-Making

All substantive decisions related to the Working Group’s Deliverables shall be made by consensus among the Working Group’s Permanent and Associate Members. As defined in First Voice’s Terms of Reference, “consensus” means that everyone involved in making the decision:
- Feels they have been heard;
- Understands the reasons for the decision and the need to take action; and
- Can support the final outcome, even if they personally hold an opposing view.

Observers are not entitled to be present during the decision-making process.

iii. Quorum

No substantive decision shall be made at any meeting of the Working Group unless a majority of Permanent Members (4) and a majority of Indigenous individuals (50 percent plus one) who are entitled to attend and to participate in the decision-making process are present.

iv. Code of Conduct

Everyone who participates in the Working Group agrees, by virtue of their participation, to abide by First Voice’s Code of Conduct.

ADMINISTRATION

First Voice is responsible for providing all necessary administrative support to ensure the Working Group is able to achieve its Deliverables. This includes:
- Coordinating and facilitating all meetings, including compiling and circulating agendas, meeting minutes, and other meeting papers in a timely manner;
- Facilitating information-sharing between and among participants and other stakeholders, including drafting and disseminating reports;
- Maintaining accountability to all project funders, including fulfilling reporting requirements;
- Providing all necessary research support;
- Ensuring compliance with the Working Group’s Terms of Reference, First Voice’s Terms of Reference, and the Code of Conduct.
AMENDMENTS

These Terms of Reference may be amended in writing after discussion at any regular meeting of the Working Group upon consensus of the Working Group’s Permanent Members and consent of the First Voice Partnership Table.
Appendix C: Final Recommendations

The Final Recommendations found below have been adopted by the Working Group on the basis of consensus. All are directed to the Government of Newfoundland and Labrador.

1. Establish a Board of Commissioners for Police Oversight (“the Police Oversight Board”) in Newfoundland and Labrador.

1.1. The Police Oversight Board must be empowered by statute to provide independent, civilian-led, proactive oversight of, and high-level policy direction to, all police forces that operate in the province. This includes:
   (a) The Royal Newfoundland Constabulary (“the RNC”);
   (b) Members of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (“the RCMP”) operating in Newfoundland and Labrador; and
   (c) Any Indigenous police forces that may be created in the future.

1.2. The Police Oversight Board must have all delegated authority commensurate with a regulatory tribunal, including the authority and the budgetary resources to:
   (a) Retain, train, and terminate any staff that are necessary to fulfilling its statutory mandate; and
   (b) Establish any appropriate branches or special offices to provide oversight in specific areas of policing or to address specific issues and priorities.

1.3. The Police Oversight Board must have the power to establish, and the authority to allocate funding to, broad policing priorities, goals, and objectives, including the ability to conduct province-wide community consultations to gather input and feedback from the public.\textsuperscript{195}

1.4. The Police Oversight Board must have the exclusive statutory power to establish and maintain province-wide policies and standards in the following areas:\textsuperscript{196}
   (a) Use of force by police officers;
   (b) Education, training, and re-training requirements for police officers;\textsuperscript{197}
   (c) Measures to eliminate discrimination by enacting anti-racist and anti-colonial approaches to policing;

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\textsuperscript{195} Adequate funding is a critical requirement for ensuring the effectiveness of any oversight body. The Alberta Serious Incident Response Team (ASIRT) serves as a prime example, as the executive director of the ASIRT recently resigned citing chronic underfunding as a main contributor to the ASIRT’s ineffectiveness. See: https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/edmonton/head-of-alberta-s-beleaguered-police-watchdog-agency-resigns-1.6261506.

\textsuperscript{196} For the RNC, the authority over these areas currently rests with the RNC Chief of Police or the Minister of Justice and Public Safety. See RNC Act, subsections 6(l)(d)(h) and (i) and subsections 57(a)(k)(l)(n) and (s). Any changes would require legislative amendments at the provincial level.

\textsuperscript{197} Manitoba and Saskatchewan set precedent for this with their police commissions, as both commissions develop policies/procedures, the code of conduct and the standard at which police officers are held. See: Manitoba’s Police Services Act, SM 2009, c 32 at section 7 & Saskatchewan’s The Police Act, 1990, SS 1990-91, c P-15.01 at section 12(1).
(d) Measures to improve the demographic diversity of police forces;
(e) Minimum standards of conduct for police officers, including offences and disciplinary measures for misconduct;¹⁹⁸
(f) Procedures and rules for processing, investigating, and responding to complaints of misconduct made against police officers; and
(g) Other policies, standards, and procedures as necessary to carry out its statutory mandate.

1.5. The Police Oversight Board must have the statutory power to initiate and conduct broad investigations and reviews of systemic challenges related to policing in the province.

1.6. The Police Oversight Board must have the statutory power to refer complaints to the following bodies:
   (a) The Royal Newfoundland Constabulary Public Complaints Commission ("the RNC PCC"), for complaints relating to police misconduct; and
   (b) The Serious Incident Response Team of Newfoundland and Labrador ("SIRT-NL"), for complaints relating to police criminal misconduct.

1.7. The Police Oversight Board must have the power to hire, retain, and terminate the following officials:
   (a) The Chief of Police of the RNC;¹⁹⁹
   (b) The Commissioner of the RNC PCC; and
   (c) The Director of SIRT-NL.²⁰⁰

2. Ensure the Police Oversight Board is politically neutral, independent of police, and reflects the province's diverse communities.

2.1. The Police Oversight Board must be empowered by statute as a regulatory commission, with its Chair appointed by and reporting directly to the House of Assembly through the Speaker as a statutory officer, in order to guarantee its political neutrality and independence from both the police and the government of the day.²⁰¹

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¹⁹⁸ For RCMP officers, the Governor in Council (i.e. the Governor General acting on the advice of Cabinet) can make regulations forming a Code of Conduct: see RCMP Act, s. 38. Any changes to this authority, at least with respect its application to Newfoundland and Labrador would likely have to be carved out from the RCMP Act itself, not simply the regulations, as it would affect who has the authority to determine these standards.

¹⁹⁹ There are precedents for oversight bodies to have such power. For example, the Ontario Civilian Police Commission has the power to suspend or remove the chief of police, other officers and even disband a whole police service. See Police Services Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. P. 15, s. 22, and the OCPC website: https://tribunalsontario.ca/ocpc/.

²⁰⁰ The power to hire, retain, and terminate the Chief of Police of the RNC and the Complaints Commissioner currently lies with the Lieutenant Governor in Council of Newfoundland and Labrador. Changes to that power would require legislative amendments at the provincial level.

²⁰¹ There is ample legal precedent for this kind of reporting structure. Currently in Newfoundland and Labrador, there are seven Statutory Offices that report directly to the House of Assembly through the Speaker, rather than to Cabinet or particular ministers. Many of these Offices perform oversight functions similar to what the Working Group is recommending here in relation to policing. Currently existing Statutory Officers include: the Commissioner for Legislative Standards, the Auditor General, the Chief Electoral Officer, the Child and Youth Advocate, the Citizens’ Representative, the Information and Privacy Commissioner, and the Seniors’ Advocate. See: https://www.assembly.nl.ca/About/StatOffices.aspx.
2.2. The Police Oversight Board must comprise a minimum of 7 and a maximum of 11 commissioners chosen by the Independent Appointments Commission, with a statutory obligation to ensure that the board reflects the province’s diversity. This includes:

(a) Gender identity and expression;
(b) Sexual orientation;
(c) Religious and racial identity;
(d) Indigenous identity, including guaranteed representation by at least one member of an Inuit community and at least one member of a First Nations community;
(e) Language communities, including English, French, and at least one Indigenous language;
(f) Citizenship and residency status; and
(g) Geography, including guaranteed representation for each of (i) Labrador, (ii) the West Coast of Newfoundland, (iii) Central Newfoundland, (iv) rural Newfoundland, and (v) the St. John’s metro region.

2.3. In order to further safeguard the Police Oversight Board’s neutrality, sitting commissioners may not be any of the following:

(a) Current or former police officers;
(b) Current publicly elected officials;
(c) Former publicly elected officials who have held office in the previous two years; or
(d) Current officials or staff of any political party.

2.4. In order to further safeguard the Police Oversight Board’s independence while also ensuring continuity of policy and expertise, the term of service for all commissioners must be staggered and formalized in law at six years in length, without the possibility of extensions or renewals.

3. **Strengthen and streamline the procedure for public complaints against police officers.**

3.1. The Royal Newfoundland Constabulary Public Complaints Commission (“the RNC PCC”) must have the statutory power to initiate investigations into police misconduct, both on its own authority and in response to direct complaints filed with it by members of the public.

3.2. By no later than 2025, the RNC PCC must transition to leadership under a sitting or former judge, rather than a practising lawyer. This requirement must be formalized in statute.\(^\text{202}\)

3.3. The RNC PCC must be granted the statutory power to engage in alternative dispute resolution processes prior to launching a formal investigation into police misconduct, provided all parties to the complaint agree.

3.4. The RNC PCC must establish new procedures for investigating complaints about police misconduct in a way that is completely neutral and independent of police forces in the province. This includes:

(a) Eliminating the practice of forwarding complaints to the RNC’s Director of Professional Standards to conduct initial investigations; and instead

(b) Engaging one or more civilian investigators, who must be neither current nor former police officers, to establish the merits of all complaints.

3.5. The RNC PCC must establish new procedures for responding to substantiated complaints about police misconduct in a way that is completely neutral and independent of police forces in the province. This includes:

(a) Eliminating the practice of forwarding substantiated complaints to the Chief of Police of the RNC to determine appropriate disciplinary measures; and instead

(b) Engaging one or more civilian adjudicators, who must not be current or former police officers, to establish the facts of the case and determine appropriate disciplinary measures that are in line with existing policies.

3.6. The RNC PCC’s panel of adjudicators must be chosen by the Independent Appointments Commission, with a statutory obligation to ensure that the panel reflects the province’s diversity. This includes:

(a) Gender identity and expression;

(b) Sexual orientation;

(c) Religious and racial identity;

(d) Indigenous identity, including guaranteed representation by at least one member of an Inuit community and at least one member of a First Nations community;

(e) Language communities, including English, French, and at least one Indigenous language;

(f) Citizenship and residency status; and

(g) Geography, including guaranteed representation for each of (i) Labrador, (ii) the West Coast of Newfoundland, (iii) Central Newfoundland, (iv) rural Newfoundland, and (v) the St. John’s metro region.

3.7. The process of filing a complaint against a police officer must be made more accessible by creating a new systems navigator position. This position would be responsible for the following:

(a) Helping members of the public understand and complete the paperwork required to file a complaint;

(b) Responding to questions from complainants about the status of their complaints; and

(c) Providing guidance to complainants in particular and members of the public in general about next steps in the complaints process.
3.8. The process of filing a complaint against a police officer must be streamlined by amending the Agreement for Policing in the Province Act, 1990, in order to bring members of the RCMP operating in the province under the jurisdiction of the RNC PCC. The jurisdiction of the Civilian Review and Complaints Commission for the RCMP (the “CRCC”) in Newfoundland and Labrador must be abolished. 203

3.9. The RNC PCC must be required by statute to file annual reports with the Police Oversight Board. At a minimum, these reports must include:

(a) Anonymized demographic information for all complainants;
(b) The number of new, ongoing, and closed investigations;
(c) The number and kind of disciplinary measures that have been imposed;
(d) Identification of systemic patterns of police misconduct, along with recommendations for eliminating them;
(e) Progress in addressing findings and recommendations; and
(f) Funding requirements to fulfill the RNC PCC’s mandate, including its duties to the community.

4. Strengthen the public’s confidence in the Serious Incident Response Team of Newfoundland and Labrador ("SIRT-NL") by ensuring its complete independence from police forces in the province.

4.1. SIRT-NL must immediately begin the transition to a truly civilian-led investigative team. This will mean moving away from the practice of seconding police officers to conduct investigations into serious incidents involving police. SIRT-NL’s investigative team must instead consist of trained civilian investigators, with no prior police experience, along with a minimum of former police officers needed to ensure investigative competence.

4.2. In the interest of transparency, SIRT-NL must adopt a standard practice of appointing community liaisons under section 12(f) of the Serious Incident Response Team Act, 2017, to monitor and report on all investigations into police negligence and misconduct, especially in cases involving racialized and other marginalized groups as well as cases involving sexual assault and/or domestic violence.

4.3. SIRT-NL must work with community organizations and stakeholders – particularly women; Black, Indigenous, and People of Colour (BIPOC); and other systemically marginalized groups – to develop and maintain a roster of readily available community liaisons. All such community liaisons must be provided with appropriate training and receive fair compensation for their time.

4.4. SIRT-NL must be required by statute to file annual reports with the Police Oversight Board. At a minimum, these reports must include:

203 The Working Group understands that bringing the RCMP officers stationed in the Province under the jurisdiction of the RNC PCC may also require amendments to other legislation.
(a) Anonymized demographic information for officers and complainants involved in complaints, incidents, and investigations; 
(b) The number of new, ongoing, and closed investigations; 
(c) The number of charges laid and convictions obtained; 
(d) Identification of systemic patterns of police misconduct, along with recommendations for eliminating them; 
(e) Progress in addressing findings and recommendations; and 
(f) Funding requirements to fulfill SIRT-NL’s mandate, including its duties to the community.

5. Other Recommendations.

5.1. The Province should immediately undertake a review of all other oversight mechanisms that currently exist for non-police organizations and personnel that are able to exercise police-like powers, with the goal of identifying regulatory gaps and proposing legislation to ensure full accountability. Such a review must include, without necessarily being limited to, the following:

(a) Wardens, guards, and other prison officials; 
(b) Fisheries and wildlife officers; and 
(c) Municipal Enforcement Officers.

5.2. Provided the above measures are implemented, the Province should work to phase out contract policing by the RCMP in Newfoundland and Labrador by 2030.
Appendix D: Critical Background

The following select bibliography of recent news articles, grouped together into relevant thematic areas, is meant to lend additional context to police oversight in Newfoundland and Labrador.

Community Relations


Governance and Accountability


Serious Incident Response Team (SIRT-NL)


Use of Force


Public Complaints and Prosecutions


Appendix E: Select List of Stakeholders

Following the release of the Working Group’s draft report that on July 18, 2022, First Voice invited more than 30 stakeholders to submit feedback on the Proposals for Change prior to finalizing them as Recommendations. The following is a select list of stakeholders who were so invited. Asterisks indicate those that provided submissions during the engagement period.

- Assembly of First Nations *
- Anti-Racism Coalition of Newfoundland and Labrador (ARC-NL)
- Black Lives Matter NL
- Indigenous Activist Collective
- Lynn Moore *
- New Democratic Party (NDP) of Newfoundland and Labrador *
- Progressive Conservative (PC) Party of Newfoundland and Labrador *
- Provincial Indigenous Women’s Steering Committee *
- The Journey Project *
- Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP)
- Royal Newfoundland Constabulary (RNC)
- Royal Newfoundland Constabulary Public Complaints Commission (RNC PCC) *
- Schulich School of Law at Dalhousie University *
- Stella’s Circle *
- Sulaimon Giwa, Ph.D.

The following stakeholders explicitly declined to provide feedback on the draft report and the Proposals for Change:

- Department of Justice and Public Safety
- Serious Incident Response Team of Newfoundland and Labrador (SiRT-NL)